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Leandro  Prados de la Escosura
  • Departamento de Ciencias Sociales
    Universidad Carlos III
    28903 Getafe (Madrid), Spain
  • Leandro Prados-de-la-Escosura, D. Phil. (Oxford University) and Ph.D. (Universidad Complutense, Madrid), Professor of... moreedit
This is an Open Access book that can be freely downloaded This text offers a comprehensive and nuanced view of the economic development of Spain since 1850. It provides a new set of historical GDP estimates for Spain from the demand and... more
This is an Open Access book that can be freely downloaded

This text offers a comprehensive and nuanced view of the economic development of Spain since 1850. It provides a new set of historical GDP estimates for Spain from the demand and supply sides, and presents a reconstruction of production and expenditure series for the century prior to the introduction of modern national accounts. The author splices available national accounts sets over the period 1958–2015 through interpolation, as an alternative to conventional retropolation. The resulting national accounts series are linked to the historical estimates providing yearly series for GDP and its components since 1850. On the basis of new population estimates, the author derives GDP per head, decomposed into labour productivity and the amount of work per person, and placed into international perspective.
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This essay offers a new set of historical GDP estimates from the demand and supply sides that revises and expands those in Prados de la Escosura (2003) and provides the basis to investigate Spain’s long run economic growth. It presents a... more
This essay offers a new set of historical GDP estimates from the demand and supply sides that revises and expands those in Prados de la Escosura (2003) and provides the basis to investigate Spain’s long run economic growth. It presents a reconstruction of production and expenditure series for the century prior to the introduction of modern national accounts. Then, it splices available national accounts sets over the period 1958-2015 through interpolation, as an alternative to conventional retropolation. The resulting national accounts series are linked to the ‘pre-statistical era’ estimates providing yearly series for GDP and its components since 1850. On the basis of new population estimates, GDP per head is derived. Trends in GDP per head are, then, drawn and, using new employment estimates, decomposed into labour productivity and the amount of work per person, and placed into international perspective.
The new Historical Index of Human Development (HIHD) covers up to 157 countries from mid-nineteenth century to 2007. In the new website http://espacioinvestiga.org/home-hihd/?lang=en a dynamic graphic presentation is available for the... more
The new Historical Index of Human Development (HIHD) covers up to 157 countries from mid-nineteenth century to 2007. In the new website http://espacioinvestiga.org/home-hihd/?lang=en
a dynamic graphic presentation is available for the aggregate historical index of human development (HIHD) and each of its dimensions across world regions. Each country’s
human development index and its dimensions, including their contribution to the aggregate index, can also be viewed and accessed separately.
The database can be downloaded from the website
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Economic freedom can be depicted as absence of interference and coercion in individuals' economic decisions. Providing a long-run view of economic freedom and its main dimensions (the legal framework and property rights, the value of... more
Economic freedom can be depicted as absence of interference and coercion in individuals' economic decisions. Providing a long-run view of economic freedom and its main dimensions (the legal framework and property rights, the value of money, international trade, and regulation) is the main goal of the new historical database. In its current version, the new Historical Index of Economic Liberty (HIEL) covers 21 of today's advanced nations, (practically those included in the OECD in 1994) over 1850-2007.
In the new website http://espacioinvestiga.org/hiel-eng/?lang=en
a dynamic graphic presentation is available for the aggregate historical index of economic liberty (HIEL) and each of its four dimensions across countries. Each country's economic freedom index and its dimensions, including their contribution to the aggregate index, can also be viewed and accessed separately.
The database can be downloaded from the website.
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This paper explores the role of agriculture in Spain’s contribution to the little divergence in Europe. On the basis of tithes, long-run trends in agricultural output are drawn. After a long period of relative stability, output suffered a... more
This paper explores the role of agriculture in Spain’s contribution to the little divergence in Europe. On the basis of tithes, long-run trends in agricultural output are drawn. After a long period of relative stability, output suffered a severe contraction during 1570-1620, followed by stagnation to 1650, and steady expansion thereafter. Output per head shifted from a relatively high to a low path that persisted until the nineteenth century. The decline in agricultural output per head and per worker from a relatively high level contributed to Spain falling behind and, hence, to the Little Divergence in Europe. Output per worker moved along labour force in agriculture over the long run, supporting the depiction of Spain as a frontier economy. Institutional factors, in a context of financial and monetary instability and war, along climatic anomalies, provide explanatory hypotheses that deserve further research.
This paper presents historical indices for the main dimensions of economic freedom and an aggregate index for nowadays developed countries -(pre-1994) OECD, for short-. Economic liberty expanded over the last one-and-a-half centuries,... more
This paper presents historical indices for the main dimensions of economic freedom and an aggregate index for nowadays developed countries -(pre-1994) OECD, for short-. Economic liberty expanded over the last one-and-a-half centuries, reaching two thirds of its maximum possible. Its evolution has been, however, far from linear. After a substantial improvement since mid-nineteenth century, World War I brought a major setback. The post-war recovery up to 1929 was followed by a dramatic decline in the 1930s and significant progress took place during the Golden Age but fell short from the pre-World War I peak. A steady expansion since the early 1980s has resulted in the highest levels of economic liberty of the last two centuries. Each main dimension of economic freedom exhibited a distinctive trend and its contribution to the aggregate index varied over time. Nonetheless, improved property rights provided the main contribution to the long-run advancement of economic liberty
Comparisons of economic performance over space and time largely depend on how statistical evidence from national accounts and historical estimates are spliced. To allow for changes in relative prices, GDP benchmark years in national... more
Comparisons of economic performance over space and time largely depend on how statistical evidence from national accounts and historical estimates are spliced. To allow for changes in relative prices, GDP benchmark years in national accounts are periodically replaced with new and more recent ones. Thus, a homogeneous long-run GDP series requires linking different temporal segments of national accounts. The choice of the splicing procedure may result in substantial differences in GDP levels and growth, particularly as an economy undergoes deep structural transformation. An inadequate splicing may result in a serious bias in the measurement of GDP levels and growth rates. Alternative splicing solutions are discussed in this paper for the particular case of Spain, a fast growing country in the second half of the twentieth century. It is concluded that the usual linking procedure, retropolation, has serious flows as it tends to bias GDP levels upwards and, consequently, to underestimate growth rates, especially for developing countries experiencing structural change. An alternative interpolation procedure is proposed.
"How has wellbeing evolved over time and across regions? How does the West compare to the Rest? What explains their differences? These questions are addressed using an historical index of human development. A sustained improvement in... more
"How has wellbeing evolved over time and across regions? How does the West compare to the Rest? What explains their differences? These questions are addressed using an historical index of human development. A sustained improvement in wellbeing has taken place since 1870. The absolute gap between OECD and the Rest widened over time, but an incomplete catching up –largely explained by education- has occurred since 1913 but fading away after 1970, when the Rest fell behind the OECD in terms of longevity. As the health transition was achieved in the Rest, the contribution of life expectancy to human development improvement declined. Meanwhile, in the OECD, as longevity increased, healthy years expanded. A large variance in human
development is noticeable in the Rest since 1970, with East Asia, Latin America and North Africa catching up to the OECD, while Central and Eastern Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa falling behind."
How has Latin America’s wellbeing evolved over time? How does Latin America compare to today’s developed countries (OECD, for short)? What explains their differences? These questions are addressed using an historical index of human... more
How has Latin America’s wellbeing evolved over time? How does Latin America compare to today’s developed countries (OECD, for short)? What explains their differences? These questions are addressed using an historical index of human development. A sustained improvement in wellbeing can be observed since 1870. The absolute gap between OECD and Latin America widened over time, but an incomplete catching up –largely explained by
education- occurred since 1900, but faded away after 1980, as Latin America fell behind the OECD in terms of longevity. Once the first health transition was exhausted, the contribution of life expectancy to human development declined
"""Long-run trends in Africa’s well-being are provided on the basis of a new index of human development, alternative to the UNDP’s HDI. A sustained improvement in African human development is found that falls, nonetheless, short of those... more
"""Long-run trends in Africa’s well-being are provided on the basis of a new index of human development, alternative to the UNDP’s HDI. A sustained improvement in African human development is found that falls, nonetheless, short of those experienced in other developing regions. Within Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa has fallen steadily behind the North since mid-20th century.
Human development improvement is positively associated to being coastal and resource-rich and negatively to political-economy distortions. Contrary to the world experience, in which life expectancy dominated, education has driven progress in African human development during the last half-a-century
and, due to the impact of HIV/AIDS on life expectancy and the arresting effect of economic mismanagement and political turmoil on growth, advances in human development since 1990 have depended almost exclusively on education achievements. The large country variance of the recovery during the last decade suggests being cautious about the future’s prospects"""
"GDP figures for Africa are unreliable. More dependable information can be found in government expenditure and international trade records. These records, though, provide little insight into non-market output. In this paper an attempt is... more
"GDP figures for Africa are unreliable. More dependable information can be found in government expenditure and international trade records. These records, though, provide little insight into non-market output. In this paper an attempt is made to draw explicit conjectures on real output per head in preindependence Africa on the basis of trade data so that conjectures can be established about Africa’s long-run growth. Two alternative approaches are considered. One estimates per capita GDP by assuming no increase in output per head outside the tradable sector, for which the purchasing power of per capita exports is accepted as a proxy. Another approach establishes an
econometric association between real per capita GDP and the income terms of trade per head for 1950-1990 and, on the basis of the prediction equation’s parameters and the values of the RHS variables, infers real output per head for 1870-1938. Trends in real output per head are then drawn for Africa (and its main regions). By comparing these trends with those from other developing
regions, some conjectures about Africa’s relative position over time are put forward. It emerges that economic growth started earlier than usually assumed and there is continuity in growth before and after colonial independence. Sub- Saharan Africa’s retardation is a gradual process, as growing and falling behind
took place simultaneously. But it is in the period 1975-1995 when the worst setback in modern Africa’s history took place."
This paper explores the role of agriculture in Spain’s contribution to the little divergence in Europe. On the basis of tithes collected by historians over the years, long-run trends in agricultural output are drawn. After a long period... more
This paper explores the role of agriculture in Spain’s contribution to the little divergence in Europe. On the basis of tithes collected by historians over the years, long-run trends in agricultural output are drawn. After a long period of relative stability, output suffered a severe contraction during 1570-1590, followed by milder deterioration to 1650. Output per head moved from a relatively high to a low path that persisted until the Peninsular War. The demand contraction, resulting from the collapse of domestic markets, monetary instability, and war in Iberia, helps to explain a less intensive use of labour and land as incentives to produce for the market sharply diminished. Agricultural output per head moved along population up to 1750. This finding confirms the view of Spain as a land abundant frontier economy. Only in the late eighteenth century a Malthusian pattern emerged
Two distinctive regimes are distinguished in Spain over half-a-millennium. A first one (1270s-1590s) corresponds to a high land-labour ratio frontier economy, pastoral, trade-oriented, and led by towns. Wages and food consumption were... more
Two distinctive regimes are distinguished in Spain over half-a-millennium. A first one (1270s-1590s) corresponds to a high land-labour ratio frontier economy, pastoral, trade-oriented, and led by towns. Wages and food consumption were relatively high. Sustained per capita growth occurred from the Reconquest’s end (1264) to the Black Death (1340s) and resumed from the 1390s only broken by late- 15th century turmoil. A second regime (1600s-1810s) corresponds to a more agricultural and densely populated low-wage economy which grew along a lower path. Contrary to preindustrial Western Europe, Spain achieved her highest living standards in the 1340s, not by mid-15th century. Although its population toll was lower, the Plague had a more damaging impact on Spain and, far from releasing non-existent demographic pressure, destroyed the equilibrium between scarce population and abundant resources. Pre-1350 per capita income was reached by the late 16th century but only overcome after 1820.
This paper is an attempt at assessing the economic impact of marketoriented reforms undertaken during General Franco’s dictatorship, in particular the 1959 Stabilisation and Liberalisation Plan. Using an index of macroeconomic... more
This paper is an attempt at assessing the economic impact of marketoriented reforms undertaken during General Franco’s dictatorship, in particular the 1959 Stabilisation and Liberalisation Plan. Using an index of macroeconomic distortions, the relationship between economic policies and
the growth record is examined. Although a gradual reduction in macroeconomic distortions was already in motion during the 1950s, the 1959 Plan opened the way to a new institutional design that favoured a free market allocation of resources and allowed Spain to accelerate growth and catch up with Western Europe. Without the 1950s reforms and, especially, the 1959 Plan, per capita GDP would have been significantly lower in 1975.
The pessimistic flavour of the Human Development Reports appears to be in contradiction with their own numbers as developing countries fare comparatively better in human development than in per capita GDP terms. This paper attempts to... more
The pessimistic flavour of the Human Development Reports appears to be in contradiction with their own numbers as developing countries fare comparatively better in human development than in per capita GDP terms. This paper attempts to bridge this gap by providing a new, ‘improved’ human development index (IHDI), informed by welfare economics. The IHDI is presented here alongside the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) HDI for the world and its main regions since the late 19th century. Social dimensions in the IHDI are derived, following Kakwani (Journal of Development Economics 41 (1993), pp. 307–336), with a convex achievement function, whereas a geometric average is employed to combine its dimensions (longevity, knowledge and income). Thus, the IHDI does not conceal the gap between rich and poor countries and casts a much less optimistic view than the conventional UNDP index, while it fits with the UNDP concern for international differences. The paper’s findings highlight main weaknesses in human development dimensions of present-day developing countries.
We investigate human capital accumulation in Spain using income- and education-based alternative approaches. We, then, assess human capital impact on labor productivity growth and discuss the implications of its alternative measures for... more
We investigate human capital accumulation in Spain using income- and education-based alternative approaches. We, then, assess human capital impact on labor productivity growth and discuss the implications of its alternative measures for TFP growth. Trends in human capital are similar with either measure but the skill-premium approach fits better Spanish historical experience. As education is a high income elastic good, human capital growth computed with the education-based approach seems upward biased for the recent past. Human capital provided a positive albeit small contribution to labor productivity growth facilitating technological innovation
New series of Spain’s capital stock and input are constructed for the last one-and-a-half centuries. Capital stock and input grew at average rates of 3.5 and 3.7 percent per year but not at a steady pace since rates accelerated... more
New series of Spain’s capital stock and input are constructed for the last one-and-a-half centuries. Capital stock and input grew at average rates of 3.5 and 3.7 percent per year but not at a steady pace since rates accelerated dramatically during the ‘Golden Age’. Two major structural changes accompanied this process. Composition of capital stock and remuneration changed gradually as the contribution of productive capital rose while that of structures declined. Spanish economy experienced capital deepening in the long-run. Although the capital-output ratio increased over time, in phases of accelerated growth the productivity of capital rose.
In this paper, new series of Spain's capital stock and input are constructed for the last one-and-a-half centuries. Capital stock and input grew at average rates of 3.5 and 3.7 percent per year but not at a steady pace since rates... more
In this paper, new series of Spain's capital stock and input are constructed for the last one-and-a-half centuries. Capital stock and input grew at average rates of 3.5 and 3.7 percent per year but not at a steady pace since rates accelerated dramatically during the 'Golden Age'. Two major structural changes accompanied this process. Composition of capital stock and remuneration changed gradually as the contribution of productive capital rose while that of structures declined. Spanish economy experienced capital deepening in the long-run. ...
Stabilizing and liberalizing policies are key elements of the Washington Consensus. This paper adds a historical dimension to the ongoing debate by assessing the economic impact of market-oriented reforms undertaken during General... more
Stabilizing and liberalizing policies are key elements of the Washington Consensus. This paper adds a historical dimension to the ongoing debate by assessing the economic impact of market-oriented reforms undertaken during General Franco’s dictatorship, the 1959 Stabilization and Liberalization Plan. Using an index of macroeconomic distortions (IMD) the relationship between economic policies and the growth record is examined. Although a gradual reduction in macroeconomic distortions was already in motion during the 1950s, the 1959 Plan opened the way to a new institutional design that favoured a free-market allocation of resources and allowed Spain to accelerating growth and catching up with Western Europe. Without the 1959 Plan, per capita GDP would have been significantly lower in 1975.
Spain's financial position during the late 19th and early 20th century has usually been presented as one of persistent deficit on current account, which resulted from her integration into international commodity and factor markets and... more
Spain's financial position during the late 19th and early 20th century has usually been presented as one of persistent deficit on current account, which resulted from her integration into international commodity and factor markets and this, in turn, slowed down growth. In this essay a preliminary reconstruction of the balance of payments on current account allows us to reject this view. In fact, a net capital inflow made possible to meet the demand for investment boosting economic performance. Current account reversals in a context of macroeconomic domestic imperfections help to explain the economic slowdown at the turn of the century.
This paper surveys the rise and fall of the European mercantilist system, and the transition to the modern, well-integrated international economy of the 19th century. It also surveys the literature on the links between trade and economic... more
This paper surveys the rise and fall of the European mercantilist system, and the transition to the modern, well-integrated international economy of the 19th century. It also surveys the literature on the links between trade and economic growth during the period, and on the economic effects of empire.
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Argentina has slipped from being among the ten world’s richest countries by the eve of World War I to its current position close to mid-range developing countries. Why did Argentina fall behind? We employ a structural model to investigate... more
Argentina has slipped from being among the ten world’s richest countries by the eve of World War I to its current position close to mid-range developing countries. Why did Argentina fall behind? We employ a structural model to investigate the extent to which the enforceability of contracts and the security of property rights, as measured by Clague et al.’s ‘‘contract intensive money’’ (CIM), conditioned broad capital accumulation and, subsequently, economic performance in Argentina. Our results suggest that poor contract enforcement played a significant role at the origins of Argentina’s unique experience of long-run decline
In this paper the economic performance of post-independence Latin America is assessed in comparative perspective. The release from the colonial fiscal burden was partly offset by higher costs of self-government, while the opening of... more
In this paper the economic performance of post-independence Latin America is assessed in comparative perspective. The release from the colonial fiscal burden was partly offset by higher costs of self-government, while the opening of independent Latin American countries to the international economy represented a handmaiden of growth. Regional disparities increased after independence, so generalisations about the region’s long-run behaviour are not straightforward.
However, on average, per capita income grew in Latin America, and although the region fell behind compared with the United States and Western Europe, it improved or maintained its position relative to the rest of the world. Thus the term 'lost decades’ appears an unwarranted depiction of the period between 1820 and 1870.
This paper surveys the rise and fall of the European mercantilist system, and the transition to the modern, well-integrated international economy of the 19th century. It also surveys the literature on the links between trade and economic... more
This paper surveys the rise and fall of the European mercantilist system, and the transition to the modern, well-integrated international economy of the 19th century. It also surveys the literature on the links between trade and economic growth during the period, and on the economic effects of empire.
Between 1850 and 2000 Spain’s real output and labor productivity grew at average rates of 2.5 and 2.1 percent. The sources of this long-run growth are investigated here for the first time. Broad capital accumulation and efficiency gains... more
Between 1850 and 2000 Spain’s real output and labor productivity grew at average rates of 2.5 and 2.1 percent. The sources of this long-run growth are investigated here for the first time. Broad capital accumulation and efficiency gains appear as complementary in Spain’s long-term growth. Factor accumulation dominated long-run growth up to 1950, while total factor productivity (TFP) led thereafter and, especially, during periods of growth acceleration. The main spurts in TFP and capital coincide with the impact of the railroads (1850s–1880), the electrification (the 1920s and 1950s), and to the adoption of new vintage technology during the Golden Age
Economic rather than political forces appear to dominate inequality trends in Spain. Inequality evolution fits a Kuznets curve. Wars increased inequality but had non-permanent effects, while progressive taxation had no impact until 1980,... more
Economic rather than political forces appear to dominate inequality trends in Spain. Inequality evolution fits a Kuznets curve. Wars increased inequality but had non-permanent effects, while progressive taxation had no impact until 1980, at odds with Atkinson, Piketty, Saez and associates' findings. A substantial fall in absolute poverty resulted from growth but also from inequality reduction in the interwar period and the late 1950s. Rising inequality and extreme poverty are not found at the roots of the Spanish Civil War. Between the mid 1950s and 1974, inequality contraction and absolute poverty eradication represented a major departure from Latin America's performance while matching the OECD's.
When did Latin America fall behind?. Has the gap between developed countries and Latin America widened over time?. This paper addresses these recurrent questions with the tools provided by the inequality literature. Long-run inter-country... more
When did Latin America fall behind?. Has the gap between developed countries and Latin America widened over time?. This paper addresses these recurrent questions with the tools provided by the inequality literature. Long-run inter-country inequality is assessed in terms of real (purchasing power-adjusted) GDP per head and of an 'improved' human development index as an indicator of welfare for present-day OECD and Latin America. A long term rise in income inequality is observed for this sample of countries with the deepening gap between OECD and Latin America as its main determinant. Contrary to a widespread view, in terms of income, Latin America fell behind in the late twentieth century. Inequality in terms of human development declined over time, but the gap between OECD and Latin America remained largely unchanged.
This article attempts to quantify the decline of Spain over the period 1500–1850. In contrast to earlier estimates that focus almost exclusively on Castilian agriculture, we look at trends in urbanisation and construct new measures of... more
This article attempts to quantify the decline of Spain over the period 1500–1850. In contrast to earlier estimates that focus almost exclusively on Castilian agriculture, we look at trends in urbanisation and construct new measures of agricultural and aggregate output at both regional and national levels. A distinctive long-run behaviour is found across Spanish regions that rejects the identification between Castile and Spain. Per capita income grew in the sixteenth and early nineteenth centuries, while contraction and stagnation occurred in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In the long run, output per head did not improve until the early nineteenth century. At the time of its imperial expansion Spain was a relatively affluent nation and, by 1590, was only behind the Low Countries and Italy in terms of per capita income. Spain's decline has its roots in the seventeenth century while its backwardness deepened in the first half of the nineteenth century.
Europe provides a suitable scenario for testing empirical regularities of growth since, to a large extent, its countries share institutions, policies, and resource endowments. Patterns of development, which associate structural change... more
Europe provides a suitable scenario for testing empirical regularities of growth since, to a large extent, its countries share institutions, policies, and resource endowments. Patterns of development, which associate structural change with variations in GDP per head and population, are constructed for modern
Europe (1850-1990) along the lines of Chenery and Syrquin’spathbreaking work. Thus, it is possible to discern whether a common set of development processes is observable for the whole continent and whether countries that had a late start exhibited, as suggested by Gerschenkron, a differential
behaviour in terms of accumulation, resource allocation, and demographic transition. The results tend to confirm the different nature of latecomers’ development.
Long run economic progress in modern Spain is assessed in this paper and its performance placed in European perspective. Over one and a half centuries, income per person rose 15 times. Three main phases can be established: 1850–1950,... more
Long run economic progress in modern Spain is assessed in this paper and its performance placed in European perspective. Over one and a half centuries, income per person rose 15 times. Three main phases can be established: 1850–1950, 1951–1974 and 1975–2000. Spain underperformed in the long run mostly due to its sluggish growth in specific phases of the century prior to 1950. Catching up took place in the late twentieth century, in which the years 1959–74 stand out. Structural change contributed significantly to growth acceleration while lack of exposition to international competition represents a recurrent element of retardation.
How have growth and inequality affected poverty reduction in Latin America over the long run? On the basis of the available evidence on growth and inequality tentative answers and conjectures are proposed about the long run evolution of... more
How have growth and inequality affected poverty reduction in Latin America over the long run? On the basis of the available evidence on growth and inequality tentative answers and conjectures are proposed about the long run evolution of poverty in Latin America. Modern Latin America experienced sustained growth since mid nineteenth century only brought to a halt during the 1980s. Inequality, in turn, rose steadily until a high plateau in which it has stabilized over the last four decades of the twentieth century. A calibration exercise on the basis of López and Servén (2005) recent empirical research suggests that absolute poverty has experienced a long-run decline in Latin America since the late nineteenth century, interrupted in the 1890s and the 1930s, and only reversed in the 1980s. Growth emerges as the main element underlying the reduction in absolute poverty, and almost exclusively in the second half of the twentieth century.
This paper discusses the economic consequences of independence in Latin America. Grand interpretations that assess Nineteenth Century Latin America by comparison to the U.S. performance are examined and the alternative approach of using... more
This paper discusses the economic consequences of independence in Latin America. Grand interpretations that assess Nineteenth Century Latin America by comparison to the U.S. performance are examined and the alternative approach of using African and Asian post-colonial experiences as the yardstick is explored. Empirical evidence on the consequences of removing the colonial burden and opening up to the international economy is, then, examined. The paper concludes with discussion of when Latin America fell behind.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note... more
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. ...
Abstract: ¿Qué origina el crecimiento económico, su aceleración o su declive?, es una preocupación secular compartida por economistas e historiadores, que se encuentra ya en William Petty y Gregory King, aunque fuera Adam Smith quien la... more
Abstract: ¿Qué origina el crecimiento económico, su aceleración o su declive?, es una preocupación secular compartida por economistas e historiadores, que se encuentra ya en William Petty y Gregory King, aunque fuera Adam Smith quien la expuso de manera sistemática ...
This paper is an attempt to assessing the costs and benefits for Europeans from their empires overseas over five centuries, in particular, the net economic gains from empire over the long 19th century when mercantilism was replaced by... more
This paper is an attempt to assessing the costs and benefits for Europeans from their empires overseas over five centuries, in particular, the net economic gains from empire over the long 19th century when mercantilism was replaced by free trade and over the period of reintegration and de-colonisation brought by the two World Wars. Paradoxically while empires were growing, empires were at best economically irrelevant for European long run growth in a free trade world. The post-1914 era shows that the benefits from imperial trading blocs were suboptimal solutions compared to open international trade.
In this paper a new set of current price estimates of per capita income, adjusted for each currency's purchasing power, is presented for more than twenty countries over the last one and a half centuries. A short-cut method is used to... more
In this paper a new set of current price estimates of per capita income, adjusted for each currency's purchasing power, is presented for more than twenty countries over the last one and a half centuries. A short-cut method is used to derive current price comparisons for countries and periods in which aggregate PPPs are not available. Current price estimates of PPP-adjusted GDP appear to be more economically sound than constant price figures as economic agents react to current, not to constant, prices and, therefore, would allow us more appropiate cross-country comparisons of welfare and productivity. Moreover, the new estimates tend to mitigate the index number problem by rendering less remote benchmarks for constant price comparisons than widely used datasets at constant 1985 or 1990 "international" dollars. Country rankings in the new data set are different from those provided by earlier cross-country comparisons and among the new findings the earlier US leadership and the closer position of Britain and France over the long 191h century can be highlighted.
This exercise in comparative measurement and analysis surveys indicators for labour and land productivities in European agricultures between 1890 and 1980. It exposes the empirical flaws and above all the range of conceptual difficulties... more
This exercise in comparative measurement and analysis surveys indicators for labour and land productivities in European agricultures between 1890 and 1980. It exposes the empirical flaws and above all the range of conceptual difficulties involved in defining agricultural outputs and inputs for purposes of international comparison. Yet the numbers do reveal how the industrialization of continental economies was constrained (and severely constrained in Mediterranean Europe) compared with that of the UK by malign historical legacies of high ratios of labour to land and an unfavourable ecological environment for the diffusion of the animal intensive technology of the first agrarian revolution.
Archivo abierto el Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Carlos III, E-Archivo Institucional Repository of University Carlos III.
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13 ensayos de reputados especialistas de América Latina, Europa y Estados Unidos
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The Black Death was the most devastating demographic shock in recorded human history. However, the effects in the European population were highly asymmetrical as were its economic consequences. This paper surveys the short and long run... more
The Black Death was the most devastating demographic shock in recorded human history. However, the effects in the European population were highly asymmetrical as were its economic consequences. This paper surveys the short and long run economic effects of the plague in Spain in European perspective. While the demographic impact in Spain was moderate compared to the European average, the economic effects were more severe and incomes per head fell sharply. This was a consequence of the existence of a frontier economy in Spain charac-terised by a relative scarcity of labour and a fragile equilibrium between factors of production. Unlike most of Europe, in Spain the Black Death increased inequality as the remuneration of labour decreased more rapidly than proprietors' gains. In the long term the Plague reinforced the frontier economy status. © 2020 Asociación Española de Historia Económica JEL classification: I10 N13 N33 O52 Keywords Black Death Frontier economy Malthusian economy Spain Los efectos económicos de la peste negra: España en perspectiva europea R E S U M E N Códigos JEL: I10 N13 N33 O52 Palabras clave: Peste negra Economía de frontera Economía Malthusiana España La peste fue el shock demográfico más devastador registrado en la historia de la humanidad. Sin embargo, los efectos en la población europea y en sus economías fueron asimétricos. Este trabajo estudia los efectos econó-micos de la peste en España en el corto y largo plazo en perspectiva europea. Mientras que el impacto demo-gráfico en España fue moderado comparado con la media europea, los efectos económicos fueron más severos y el ingreso per cápita descendió abruptamente. Esto se debió a la existencia de una economía de frontera en España caracterizada por la escasez de trabajo y un frágil equilibrio entre los factores de producción. Al contra-rio que en la mayoría de Europa, en España la peste incremento la desigualdad al descender la remuneración del trabajo más rápidamente que las ganancias de los propietarios. En el largo plazo la peste reforzó el estatus de economía de frontera.